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We establish a lower bound on the asymptotic secret key rate of continuous-variable quantum
key distribution with a discrete modulation of coherent states. The bound is valid against collective
attacks and is obtained by formulating the problem as a semidefinite program. We illustrate our
general approach with the quadrature phase-shift keying (QPSK) modulation scheme and show that
distances over 100 km are achievable for realistic values of noise. We also discuss the application
to more complex quadrature amplitude modulations (QAM) schemes. This result opens the way
to establishing the full security of continuous-variable protocols with a discrete modulation, and
thereby to the large-scale deployment of these protocols for quantum key distribution.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is the task of estab-
lishing a secret key between two distant parties, Alice and
Bob, who can access an untrusted quantum channel and
an authenticated classical channel [1]. Remarkably, very
simple protocols based on the exchange of quantum states
exist and have been proven secure against any eaves-
dropper only limited by the laws of quantum mechanics.
The first QKD protocol, BB84, was invented by Bennett
and Brassard and simply requires Alice to send qubit
states from the set {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉), |−〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉− |1〉)} through the quantum channel, and Bob to
perform a measurement in one of the two bases {|0〉, |1〉}
or {|+〉, |−〉}. This provides them with some correlated
data which can then be distilled into a secret key, pro-
vided that the correlations are large enough [2].
The main drawback of BB84-like protocols based on
the exchange of qubit states lies in the detection part
which necessitates single-photon detectors. An interest-
ing solution to avoid this costly and specific equipment
is to replace it by coherent detection, which is the cur-
rent industry standard in coherent optical telecommuni-
cation [3, 4]. This is the idea behind continuous-variable
(CV) QKD [5–7]. In CVQKD protocols, information is
encoded on the quadratures of the quantized electromag-
netic field: Alice prepares coherent states, i.e., displaced
vacuum states, while Bob performs homodyne or hetero-
dyne (also called double-homodyne) detection to estab-
lish some correlations with Alice [8]. These correlations
can then be turned into a secret key by a classical post-
processing procedure similar to that of BB84.
Continuous variables enjoy a number of advantages for
QKD: the hardware implementation is simpler since it
corresponds to techniques already deployed in classical
telecommunication and the secret key rate (i.e., the ra-
tio between the final key size and the number of states
exchanged on the quantum channel) is higher than for
qubit-based protocols [9]. In fact, the main difficulty aris-
ing with CVQKD concerns security proofs: because the
description of the protocol explicitly involves an infinite
dimensional Fock space, many of the proof techniques
developed for qubit-based protocols become unavailable,
and new approaches are needed.
The Graal in the context of security proofs is to estab-
lish a composable security proof in the finite-size regime,
valid against general attacks. For BB84, it took about
20 years to reach that level, most notably with the work
of Renner [10] and better analyses continue to improve
the key rates [11–15]. The situation is less advanced
for CVQKD since only a few CV protocols are currently
known to enjoy such security: protocols based on the ex-
change of coherent states and heterodyne detection [16–
18], and protocols with squeezed states and homodyne
detection [19, 20], but crucially only protocols where
the states are modulated according to a Gaussian dis-
tribution. This state-of-affairs is not quite satisfactory
because a Gaussian modulation can never be perfectly
achieved in practice, and real protocols necessarily ap-
proximate such a Gaussian by some finite constellation of
finite energy [21, 22]. Beyond this theoretical argument,
a discrete modulation would present important advan-
tages both on the hardware side since it would simplify
the state preparation procedure [5, 23–25] and on the
software side since the crucial step of error correction
is dramatically simplified with a small constellation of
states [26]. More generally, if quantum key distribution
is to be deployed at large scale, it is crucial that it con-
forms as much as possible to telecom standards, which
currently involve discrete modulations of coherent states
and coherent detection.
For these reasons, an outstanding and pressing open
question of the field is to establish the security of
CVQKD with a discrete modulation. Current security
proofs restrict the possible attacks performed by the
eavesdropper to emulate a linear quantum channel be-
tween Alice and Bob [26] (see also [27] and [28]). We
also note that Ref. [29] analyzed the security of a 2-state
protocol and [30] the security of a 3-state protocol, but
the corresponding bounds are very pessimistic in term
of resistance to loss, and the proof techniques in these
papers are unlikely to easily generalize to more useful
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2modulation schemes. An alternative approach to simplify
the error correction procedure is to rely on post-selection
[25, 31, 32], but security proofs for such protocols are
currently restricted to Gaussian attacks, which are not
believed to be optimal [27, 33]. Gaussian post-selection
has also been investigated in the literature mainly be-
cause security proofs are easier to obtain [34, 35], but
the performance of these variants is still not well under-
stood.
In this paper, we present a major step towards the full
security of CVQKD with a discrete modulation, by in-
troducing a new proof technique that establishes a lower
bound valid against arbitrary collective attacks, in the
asymptotic limit of infinitely long keys. For concrete-
ness, we first illustrate it for the quadrature phase-shift
keying (QPSK) protocol and then discuss its extension to
larger quadrature amplitude modulations (QAM). This
is significant since the secret key rate against collective
attacks, where the quantum channel is assumed to be
identical for all uses, usually coincides with the secret
key rate valid against arbitrary attacks in the asymptotic
limit [17, 36, 37]. Obtaining a composable security proof
as well as computing the secret key rate in the finite-
size regime would require to fully address the parameter
estimation procedure, which is left for future work.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section I,
we recall the description of the QPSK protocol of [26].
In Section II, we discuss the specific challenges raised by
the security analysis of CVQKD protocols with a discrete
modulation. We present our security proof for the QPSK
protocol and some numerical results in Section III, and
then explain how to extend the approach to more general
QAM in Section IV. We finally discuss some limitations
and outline future work in Section V.
I. THE QPSK PROTOCOL
The QPSK constellation that we consider consists of
four coherent states {|αk〉}k=0···3 with |αk〉 := |ikα〉 =
e−α
2/2
∑
n≥0 e
iknpi2 α
n√
n!
|n〉, where α > 0 is a parameter
to be optimized later. The Prepare-and-Measure (PM)
version protocol is as follows. Alice picks a random bit
string x = (x0, . . . , x2L−1) of length 2L (for some large
L) and successive pairs of bits are encoded as coher-
ent states of the form |αk`〉 with k` = 2x2` + x2`+1,
as depicted in Fig. 1. She sends these coherent states
through the channel and Bob measures each output
mode with heterodyne detection to obtain a 2L-string
z = (z0, . . . , z2L−1) ∈ R2L. This string is then converted
into a raw key of 2L bits y = (y0, . . . , y2L−1) given by
(y2`, y2`+1) =

(0, 0) if z2`+1 < z2`, z2`+1 ≥ −z2`,
(0, 1) if z2`+1 ≥ z2`, z2`+1 > −z2`,
(1, 0) if z2`+1 > z2`, z2`+1 ≤ −z2`,
(1, 1) if z2`+1 ≤ z2`, z2`+1 < −z2`.
Bob further reveals the values of |z2` ± z2`+1| publicly.
This information allows Alice and Bob to turn the infor-
FIG. 1. Description of the QPSK protocol with a constellation
of 4 coherent states and the partition of phase-space in four
quadrants.
mation reconciliation problem into a well-studied channel
coding problem for the binary-input additive white-noise
Gaussian channel (see Section 5.2 of [38] for further de-
tails about this procedure). The remaining steps of the
protocol are standard, namely parameter estimation (dis-
cussed below), information reconciliation (Bob sends ad-
ditional information on the classical channel to help Alice
guess the string y) and privacy amplification (so that Eve
has no information about the final key).
The goal of parameter estimation is to decide whether
the raw key can be turned into a secret key via classi-
cal postprocessing. More precisely, the idea is to check
that the correlations between Alice and Bob’s strings x
and z are strong enough to guarantee that Eve only has
limited knowledge about the raw key. For BB84-like pro-
tocols, parameter estimation consists in evaluating the
quantum bit error rate between Alice and Bob’s data.
For CVQKD, the parameter of interest is the covariance
matrix. In particular, for the 4-state protocol considered
here, the quality of the correlations depends on two pa-
rameters: the “covariance” c and the variance v of Bob’s
states. To define these numbers in the case of a col-
lective attack, we write the classical-quantum (cq) state
shared by Alice and Bob in the PM version of the proto-
col as ρcq =
1
4
∑3
k=0 Πk ⊗ E(|αk〉〈αk|) where {Πk}k=0...3
are four orthogonal projectors and E denotes the quan-
tum channel from Alice to Bob. Let us further define the
quadrature operators on Bob’s phase space as qˆ = b+ b†,
pˆ = i(b†− b), with b and b† the annihilation and creation
operators so that [qˆ, pˆ] = 2i. With these notations, we
define
c = tr [((Π0 −Π2)⊗ qˆ + (Π1 −Π3)⊗ pˆ) ρcq]
v =
1
2
tr
[(
14 ⊗ (qˆ2 + pˆ2)
)
ρcq
]
. (1)
3As an example, we can compute these two parameters
if the quantum channel between Alice and Bob is a
bosonic phase-invariant Gaussian channel of transmit-
tance T and excess noise ξ, meaning that a coherent state
|β〉 is mapped to a thermal state centered on √Tβ with
variance 1 + Tξ. In this case, we obtain c(T, ξ) = 2
√
Tα
and v(T, ξ) = 1 + 2Tα2 + Tξ. In particular, under the
assumption that the channel is Gaussian, one can recover
the values of T and ξ from the parameters c and v ob-
served in the protocol.
As already mentioned, the QPSK protocol presents a
number of advantages against protocols with a Gaussian
modulation of coherent states such as [6, 39]. First, Alice
simply needs to generate random bits and not Gaussian
random variables that would then need to be discretized
with sufficient precision. Second, the state preparation
only requires a phase modulator, instead of both a phase
and an amplitude modulators. Another strong argument
in favor of this protocol is relative to the complexity of
classical error correction. It is indeed well known that
the reconciliation of Gaussian variables (as required for
the protocols of [6] and [39]) is quite costly and requires
to decode classical error correcting codes of length 2L
[40–42]. In contrast, the binary nature of the raw key
in the QPSK protocol allows Alice and Bob to aggre-
gate the symbols in large blocks of size m, and to only
decode classical codes of length 2L/m, thus reducing the
postprocessing complexity by a factor m (which typically
scales like 1/T ).
Of course, the QPSK protocol also has some limita-
tions. In particular, for our security proof to provide a
meaningful bound on the secret key rate, the mixture of
four coherent states should approximate a thermal state,
which limits the possible value of α to low numbers. A
natural solution to this problem is to increase the size
of the constellation and rely on more general QAM, as
discussed in Section IV.
II. CHALLENGES RAISED BY A DISCRETE
MODULATION
Establishing the security of CVQKD against general
attacks turned out to be much more challenging that for
BB84-like protocols. Currently, there exist two main ap-
proaches to do so. The first approach relies on an entropic
uncertainty principle and has been successfully applied
to the protocol of Ref. [43] which requires Alice to pre-
pare squeezed states [19]. For the moment, it is unclear
whether a tighter version of entropic uncertainty prin-
ciple could also work for protocols with coherent states
(see Ref. [44] for a review). The second approach fol-
lows a general strategy for establishing the security of
a protocol against general attacks: one first appeals to
a de Finetti-type theorem to reduce the problem to the
case of collective attacks, and security against collective
attacks is analyzed thanks to some version of the asymp-
totic equipartition property [45], stating essentially that
the asymptotic secret key rate is given by the so-called
Devetak-Winter rate KDW [46]:
KDW = I(X;Y )− supχ(Y ;E), (2)
where I(X;Y ) stands for the mutual information be-
tween Alice’s variable X and Bob’s variable Y , χ(Y ;E)
for the Holevo information between Y and Eve’s quan-
tum system E, with the supremum computed over all
quantum channels E compatible with the correlations c
and v observed during parameter estimation. Before pro-
viding more details about KDW, let us mention that de
Finetti-type theorems exist for continuous-variable sys-
tems: Ref. [37] provides a (rather loose) version valid
for permutation-invariant protocols (which is the case of
essentially all CVQKD protocols), and Ref. [17] gives
a tighter version but only for protocols displaying a
stronger invariance in phase-space, such as the protocols
of [39, 47]. Studying collective attacks, i.e., computing
KDW, is rather straightforward for BB84-like protocols
since it only involves an optimization over some finite-
dimensional space. However, this is not the case for CV
protocols, and bounding the quantity supχ(Y ;E) is non-
trivial since one must optimize over states in the full Fock
space. In fact, there are two different issues here: (i) how
to obtain a robust estimate of c and v defined in Eq. (1);
and (ii) how to compute the supremum of χ(Y ;E) over
all states compatible with c and v.
Let us first examine the first question. For the mo-
ment, the only protocols for which we are able to ana-
lyze parameter estimation (of a covariance matrix), with
the proper error bounds, are those with the invariance
in phase-space, using the ideas of Ref. [16]. The dif-
ficulty is that the parameters to be estimated are not
bounded (contrary to the case of BB84 where the error
rate is between 0 and 1), and computing a confidence re-
gion for them requires that the protocol is invariant un-
der unitary transformations in phase-space, or requires
some additional assumptions (for instance that the state
is Gaussian, or that some moment of the variables are
upper bounded by some explicit value). In the present
paper, we do not address this question that we leave for
future work.
In order to discuss the second question, we need to
be more precise about the term χ(Y ;E). This Holevo
information is computed for a tripartite quantum state
ρAY E , which is a quantum-classical-quantum state ob-
tained when Bob measures system B of another state
ρABE with heterodyne detection. These states appear in
the entanglement-based (EB) version of the QPSK pro-
tocol. In this version, Alice initially prepares L copies
of the bipartite pure state |Φ〉 = 12
∑3
k=0 |ψk〉A|αk〉A′ ,
where {|ψk〉}k=0...3 forms an orthonormal basis of the
space spanned by the four coherent states (the precise
definition of |ψk〉 does not matter at this stage), keeps
register A and sends register A′ to Bob through the quan-
tum channel. Note that if Alice measures register A in
the basis {|ψk〉}k=0...3, then she projects the state in A′
onto one of the four coherent states, with uniform prob-
4ability. Hence, the EB and PM versions of the protocol
are undistinguishable from the outside of Alice’s labs,
which implies that both protocols have the same secu-
rity. In the context of a collective attack, it makes sense
to describe the quantum channel between Alice and Bob
by a completely positive trace preserving (CPTP) map:
E : A′ → B, or equivalently by an isometry UA′→BE .
The tripartite state shared by Alice, Bob and Eve then
reads:
ρABE = (idA ⊗ UA′→BE)(|Φ〉〈Φ|),
where idA is the identity map on register A. Register
B is then measured with heterodyne detection, which
is modeled by another CPTP map MB→Y , correspond-
ing to the resolution of the identity by coherent states:
1 = 1pi
∫
C
|α〉〈α|dα. This finally gives ρAY E = (idA ⊗
MB→Y ⊗ idE)(ρABE). One can also apply the isometry
UA′→BE to the cq state ρ0cq = 14
∑3
k=0 Πk ⊗ |αk〉〈αk| and
recovers ρcq = trE(UA′→BE(ρ0cq)). We are now ready to
define the term supχ(Y ;E) appearing in the Devetak-
Winter rate: this is the supremum of the Holevo infor-
mation between Y and E computed for ρAY E , optimized
over all isometries UA′→BE yielding parameters c and v
when applied to ρ0cq. In other words, Alice and Bob ob-
serve correlations in the PM protocol (corresponding to
the version that they indeed implement in practice) and
must infer a bound on χ(Y ;E) computed on the tripartite
state that they would share with Eve if they had instead
implemented the EB version of the protocol. This bound
should hold for any quantum channel compatible with
the parameters they observe.
The optimization appearing in the Devetak-Winter is
thus highly nontrivial for CV protocols since the isome-
try A′ → BE is an arbitrary isometry between infinite-
dimensional Fock spaces. Quite remarkably, it is possible
to compute the supremum of χ(Y ;E) over states ρAY E
with a fixed covariance matrix for ρAB . This is known as
the optimality of Gaussian states [48]. A second remark-
able fact is that when the modulation of coherent states
is Gaussian in the PM version, then one can directly com-
pute the covariance matrix of ρAB from the correlations
observed in the PM version [49], and we will provide a
short proof of this fact in Section IV. By combining both
properties, one can then compute the Devetak-Winter
rate for protocols involving a Gaussian modulation of co-
herent states [50] (see also [51] for an alternative proof).
In the case of CV protocols with a discrete modulation,
the optimality of Gaussian states still works and provides
a bound on χ(Y ;E) for a given covariance matrix of the
state ρAB appearing in the EB version of the protocol.
What is missing, however, is a direct way to compute this
covariance matrix from the parameters c and v accessible
in an experiment (in the PM protocol). Solutions to this
problem are to restrict the possible quantum channels to
linear bosonic channels, as done in Ref. [26], or to add
decoy states as in [52]. Neither solution is satisfactory,
since the first does not yield a general security proof, and
the second basically renders moot all the advantage of the
discrete modulation (since Alice must still implement a
Gaussian modulation, and the error correction procedure
remains quite heavy). We will now present a much better
solution to this problem.
III. A LOWER BOUND IN THE ASYMPTOTIC
LIMIT
As we already pointed out, we do not consider com-
posability issues in this work and in particular, we re-
strict our attention to the asymptotic scenario, assuming
that the parameters c and v of Eq. (1) are known. Our
goal is then to compute the Devetak-Winter rate KDW of
Eq. (2). As explained in the previous section, thanks to
the optimality of Gaussian states [48], our task is simply
to perform an optimization over the possible covariance
matrices of ρAB compatible with the values of c and v.
We first discuss the special case of the pure-loss (noise-
less) channel, before moving to the general case of arbi-
trary channels and providing some numerical results.
A. The pure-loss channel
Dealing with a pure-loss channel is much easier than
the general case because the pure-loss channel is essen-
tially the only channel yielding parameters of the form
c = 2
√
Tα and v = 1 + 2Tα2 for some T ∈ [0, 1]. Here, α
is the amplitude of the coherent states prepared by Alice.
From such parameters, one immediately infers that a co-
herent state |αk〉 is mapped to another coherent |
√
Tαk〉.
Without loss of generality, the isometry U is of the form
U|αk〉A′ = |
√
Tαk〉B |µk〉E for some states {|µk〉}k=0...3.
The output states have to be product states otherwise the
output in register B would not be pure and the channel
would add some noise. Recall that the Gram matrix of a
vector of states (|v1〉, . . . , |vn〉) is the n×n matrix G with
entries Gk,` = 〈vk, v`〉. We can see that the Gram matri-
ces of {|√1− Tαk〉} and {|µk〉} coincide, since 〈αk|α`〉 =
〈tαk|tα`〉〈µk|µ`〉 = 〈tαk|tα`〉〈
√
1− Tαk|
√
1− Tα`〉, with
t =
√
T . The first equality follows from the fact that U
is an isometry and the second is obtained by applying
a beam-splitter transformation of transmittance T . Us-
ing the polar decomposition, if two Gram matrices of the
form M1M
†
1 and M2M
†
2 coincide, then there exists some
isometry V such that M1 = M2V . In particular, it means
that there is a local isometry mapping |µk〉 to |rαk〉, with
r =
√
1− T . This proves that the channel can also be
modeled as
U ′|αk〉A′ = |
√
Tαk〉B |
√
1− Tαk〉E , (3)
and therefore that the channel behaves like the pure-loss
channel restricted to our set of states. In particular, since
we know the value of of c and therefore of T , it is easy to
compute the covariance matrix of ρAB in the EB version
of the protocol.
5B. General lower bound via semidefinite
programming
We now turn to the general case of dealing with noisy
channels. Let us recast our problem by considering the
EB version of the protocol. Alice prepares the initial
state
|Φ〉 := (1⊗√ρPM)|EPR〉,
where ρPM :=
1
4
∑3
k=0 |αk〉〈αk| is the mixture of the 4 co-
herent states prepared in the PM protocol and |EPR〉 :=∑∞
n=0 |n, n〉 is the maximally entangled (unnormalized)
state between two modes. This state is a purification of
ρPM and this specific choice is made because it maximises
the correlation between its two modes. More explicitly,
we obtain:
|Φ〉 = 1
2
3∑
k=0
|ψk〉|αk〉,
with |ψk〉 = 12
∑3
m=0 e
−ikmpi2 |φm〉 and
|φm〉 = 1√
νm
∞∑
n=0
α4n+m√
(4n+m)!
|4n+m〉
where ν0,2 =
1
2 (cosh(α
2)± cos(α2)), ν1,3 = 12 (sinh(α2)±
sin(α2)) and |4n+m〉 denotes the Fock state with 4n+m
photons.
The quantum channel between Alice and Bob can be
described via its Kraus operators {Ei} which satisfy∑
iE
†
iEi = 1A′ . The quantum state ρAB = (idA ⊗
E)(|Φ〉〈Φ|) is therefore
ρAB =
1
4
3∑
k,`=0
|ψk〉〈ψ`| ⊗ σk,`, (4)
where we defined σk,` =
∑
iEi|αk〉〈α`|E†i .
Our goal is to bound the covariance matrix of ρAB for
any possible quantum channel E yielding some fixed val-
ues for c and v. By symmetry of the protocol, we are
in fact only interested in 3 parameters, corresponding to
the variance of ρA, the variance of ρB and the covari-
ance. This means that without loss of generality, we can
assume that the covariance matrix takes the following
form
[
VA12 ZσZ
ZσZ VB12
]
, where σZ =
[
1 0
0 −1
]
, and VA = 1+2α
2
only depends on |Φ〉, VB = v. In particular, there is a sin-
gle unknown, Z, that we need to bound. Since χ(Y ;E)
is a decreasing function of Z when the other parameters
are fixed, we only need to get a lower bound on Z as a
function of c and v. The parameter Z is defined as the
expectation of 12 (qˆAqˆB − pˆApˆB) for the state ρAB , which
corresponds to
Z = tr
[
(ab+ a†b†)ρAB
]
,
where a and a† are the annihilation and creation opera-
tors on the Fock space of register A.
Let us define Π =
∑3
k=0 |ψk〉〈ψk| to be the orthogonal
projector onto the space spanned by the four coherent
states and C = ΠaΠ ⊗ b + Πa†Π ⊗ b†. With these no-
tations, we have Z = tr(CX)where X is the (unknown)
state ρAB . This matrix X, which is positive semidefinite
with trace 1, must satisfy some linear constraints, namely
tr(B0X) = v and tr(B1X) = c for
B0 = Π⊗ (1 + 2b†b)
B1 = ((|ψ0〉〈ψ0| − |ψ2〉〈ψ2|)⊗ qˆ
+(|ψ1〉〈ψ1| − |ψ3〉〈ψ3|)⊗ pˆ) .
The final constraint is trBX = trB |Φ〉〈Φ|, which is∑3
k,`=0〈α`|αk〉 |ψk〉〈ψ`|. In other words, we are inter-
ested in the following problem:
min tr(CX) (5)
such that

tr(B0X) = v
tr(B1X) = c
tr(Bk,`X) =
1
4 〈α`|αk〉
X  0,
where the last constraint means that X is positive
semidefinite and where we have defined Bk,` = |ψ`〉〈ψk|.
This is a semidefinite program which can be solved nu-
merically. Denoting by Z∗ the optimum of this pro-
gram, we are able to compute an explicit lower bound
on supχ(Y ;E) by taking the value of the Holevo infor-
mation for a Gaussian state ρ∗AB with covariance matrix
Γ∗ =
[
(1+2α2)12 Z
∗σZ
Z∗σZ v12
]
. This quantity is then computed
with standard techniques [53] and is given by
χ(Y ;E)ρ∗AB = g
(
ν1 − 1
2
)
+ g
(
ν2 − 1
2
)
− g
(
ν3 − 1
2
)
,
where g(x) := (x + 1) log2(x + 1) − x log2(x), ν1 and
ν2 are the symplectic eigenvalues of Γ
∗ and ν3 = 1 +
2α2 − Z∗21+v . It satisfies χ(Y ;E)ρ∗AB ≥ supUA′→BE χ(Y ;E)
where the optimization is over isometries compatible with
parameters c and v. We present numerical results in the
next subsection.
One might wonder whether all the solutions of this
program correspond to valid quantum states for some
quantum channel E . This is the case since the only con-
straint that must be satisfied by any channel is that
trBX = trB |Φ〉〈Φ|. In other words, because the ini-
tial state is pure, and because all purifications of ρA are
equivalent up to an isometry on the purifying system BE,
there always exists an isometry from A′ to BE mapping
|Φ〉 to any valid solution X of the SDP.
C. Numerical results
In this section, we compute the key rate for Gaussian
channels characterized by a transmittance T and excess
noise ξ. It is important to note that the proof presented
6above does not make any assumption about the quantum
channel E between Alice and Bob, since the mutual in-
formation between their data, as well as the values of c
and v can be estimated during the protocol. In order to
display numerical results without sampled data, we will
use the expressions of I(X;Y ), c and v as functions of
T and ξ, as given for Gaussian channels which provide a
realistic model for quantum channels that typically occur
in experiments. The values computed from the SDP will
thus give lower bounds for the key rates, easy to compare
to the ones assuming a Gaussian or linear channel [26].
To take into account the imperfect error correction pro-
cedure between Alice and Bob, as in realistic implemen-
tations, we plot a modified version of the Devetak-Winter
rate given by βI(X;Y )− supχ(Y ;E), with a reconcilia-
tion efficiency parameter β ≤ 1. The mutual information
I(X;Y ) should be computed for a binary-input additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel [54], but in the
relevant regime of parameters for us, it is very well ap-
proximated by the capacity of an AWGN channel and
given by
I(X;Y ) ≈ log2
(
1 +
2Tα2
2 + Tξ
)
.
For each channel, we compute the parameters c(T, ξ) and
v(T, ξ) that Alice and Bob would obtain during parame-
ter estimation (in the asymptotic limit), and solve the
SDP of Eq. (5) to upper bound supχ(Y ;E) by some
χ(Y ;E)ρ∗AB . Since this SDP involves infinite-dimensional
matrices, it is necessary to truncate this space in order
to get numerical results. It is natural to truncate the
Fock space of Bob by the space spanned by the first N
Fock states: |0〉, |1〉, . . . , |N − 1〉, thus obtaining a full
Hilbert space of dimension 4N (since Alice’s local space
can be taken to be the 4-dimensional space spanned by
{|αk〉}k=0...3). In practice, we observe that the results
do not depend on the specific value of N provided that
it is larger than 10. Note that the fact that we need to
truncate the Fock space is not necessarily an important
issue for security proofs: this is because composable se-
curity proofs of CVQKD usually require to project the
state onto a low-dimensional subspace of the Fock space
anyway, via some energy test [37]. We use the solver SCS
[55, 56] and set the precision below 10−5.
We plot our lower bound on the Devetak-Winter rate
β log2
(
1 +
2Tα2
2 + Tξ
)
− χ(Y ;E)ρ∗AB ≤ KDW
for three different values of excess noise: ξ = 0.002 in
Fig. 2, ξ = 0.005 in Fig. 3 and ξ = 0.01 in Fig. 4. We
remark that distances much larger than 100 km are pos-
sible provided that the excess noise is sufficiently small,
and that such values have already been obtained in ex-
perimental demonstrations [57, 58]. Note that in realistic
implementations, the detectors are inevitably noisy and
display a limited efficiency. In a scenario where these im-
perfections are possibly controlled by the eavesdropper,
the secret key rate would be much lower than the ones
displayed on Fig. 2, 3 and 4. It is, however, legitimate to
consider a more optimistic scenario where the imperfec-
tions of the detectors are not assumed to be controlled
by the eavesdropper [1]. In this case, the secret key rate
can be computed following the method of [53]. Because
the effect of imperfections in the trusted-detector-noise
scenario is typically quite mild [59], we chose to ignore it
here and assumed ideal detectors for Bob.
FIG. 2. Secret key rate versus distance, for a Gaussian
channel with transmittance T = 10−0.02d and excess noise
ξ = 0.002. Here d is the distance between Alice and Bob in
km. The value of α is 0.35. The reconciliation efficiency β is
set to 0.95. The top curve corresponds to the performance of
the protocol [39] with a Gaussian modulation, the lower curve
to the performance of the four-state protocol while assuming
a linear channel (as in [26]) and the crosses correspond to the
lower bound given by our SDP.
FIG. 3. Secret key rate versus distance, for a Gaussian
channel with transmittance T = 10−0.02d and excess noise
ξ = 0.005. Other parameters are the same as in Fig. 2.
7FIG. 4. Secret key rate versus distance, for a Gaussian
channel with transmittance T = 10−0.02d and excess noise
ξ = 0.01. Other parameters are the same as in Fig. 2.
As we noted earlier, the main limitation of the QPSK
protocol probably concerns the small value of α. In-
deed, our approach relies on the closeness between a ther-
mal state (corresponding to the Gaussian modulation,
and for which we know the exact secret key rate) and
a mixture of four coherent states. These two mixtures
are only approximately undistinguishable in the regime
where α  1, and indeed the performance of the QPSK
protocol degrades rapidly for α ≥ 0.5, corresponding to
about α2 ≈ 0.25 photon per pulse. This behaviour is
illustrated in Fig. 5. To overcome this limitation, it is
FIG. 5. Secret key rate versus α, for a distance of 50 km and
excess noise of ξ = 0.002. Other parameters are the same as
in Fig. 2.
possible to exploit more complicated quadrature ampli-
tude modulations (QAM) that will better approximate
thermal states with a large variance, as discussed below.
This is notably explored in [21, 22] in the context of quan-
tum key distribution and in [3, 4, 60] for communication
over bosonic Gaussian channels.
IV. LARGER CONSTELLATIONS
While we chose to illustrate our technique with the
QPSK modulation in this paper, our SDP approach gen-
eralizes in a straightforward way to more complex modu-
lation schemes. For these schemes, we start with a target
Gaussian modulation, described by some thermal state
ρ(γ) = (1− γ2)
∞∑
k=0
γ2k|k〉〈k|
of parameter γ > 0, and a good modulation scheme will
aim at approximating this state by a mixture of a finite
number of coherent states.
Consider for instance a modulation where n coher-
ent states {|αk〉}k=1...n are prepared with probability
{pk}k=1...n. A possible example would be to take n
coherent states on a circle (Phase-Shift Keying) of the
form |αeik 2pim 〉, as considered for instance in [28, 61],
or more general QAM as in Ref. [62]. The average
state prepared by Alice in the PM version is simply
ρn =
∑n
k=1 pk|αk〉〈αk|. In the EB version of the pro-
tocol, Alice would prepare the initial bipartite pure state
|Φn〉 = (1 ⊗ √ρn)
∑∞
i=0 |i〉|i〉 where |i〉 is a Fock state
with i photons. This specific choice of purification is
made to maximize the value of the parameter Z in the
covariance matrix, and therefore to maximize the result-
ing lower bound on the secret key rate. In particular, the
objective function of our SDP will be tr
(
(ab+ a†b†)ρAB
)
with ρAB = (id⊗ E)(|Φn〉〈Φn|).
We now need to write the constraints of our SDP.
The first constraint is simply that the partial trace
trB(ρAB) should coincide with the partial trace of the ini-
tial state, trB(|Φn〉〈Φn|) = ρn. This yields the constraint
trB(ρAB) = ρn. The second constraint corresponds to
the variance of Bob’s reduced state, and this is given as
before by tr(1⊗ (1+ 2b†b)X) = v. The third constraint
requires slightly more work since one needs to relate the
correlations c observed in the PM protocol to a measure-
ment applied to ρAB .
For a general QAM, the best way to define c is similar
to what is done in the protocols with a Gaussian mod-
ulation: it should be the average of the dot product be-
tween the L-dimensional complex vector (αk1 , . . . , αkL)
of states sent by Alice and the L-dimensional com-
plex vector (β1, . . . , βL) of measurement results of Bob.
Here β` is the outcome of the heterodyne detection of
E(|αk`〉〈αk` |), which is the state received by Bob for the
`th use of the channel. This dot product can be alter-
natively written as the expectation of α¯kβk, where the
conjugation is a consequence of working with complex
variables. Let us denote by M1∞ the observable corre-
8sponding to heterodyne detection:
M1∞ =
1
pi
∫
C
β|β〉〈β|dβ.
Our definition of c is therefore:
c :=
n∑
k=1
pkα¯ktr(M
1
∞E(|αk〉〈αk|)).
We now need to express c as the expectation of an ob-
servable applied to the state ρAB in the EB protocol.
First, we observe that by construction, there exists an
n-outcome measurement {Fk}k=1...n on system A such
that outcome k prepares the coherent state |αk〉 on the
second mode. To see this, let us introduce the pu-
rification |Φ′〉CB =
∑n
k=1
√
pk|φk〉C |αk〉B of ρn, where
{|φk〉}k=1...n is an orthonormal family. Both |Φn〉AB and
|Φ′〉CB are purifications of ρn so there exists an isom-
etry V : C → B such that (V ⊗ 1)|Φ′〉CB = |Φn〉AB
and one can choose Fk = V |φk〉〈φk|V †. This measure-
ment satisfies
∑n
k=1 Fk = 1 and 〈Φn|Fk ⊗ 1|Φn〉 = pk.
Let us define the following complex-valued observable
Mn =
∑n
k=1 αkFk. It correctly yields αk when the
state sent by Alice through the quantum channel is
|αk〉. We can finally use the fact that trA(M†nρAB) =∑n
k=1 pkα¯kE(|αk〉〈αk|) to express c as:
c = tr((M†n ⊗M1∞)ρAB).
With these notations in place, we are now ready to de-
fine the SDP that computes the term tr
(
(ab+ a†b†)ρAB
)
of the covariance matrix of ρAB in the EB version of the
protocol, namely
min tr((ab+ a†b†)X) (6)
such that

trBX = ρn
tr(1⊗ (1+ 2b†b)X) = v
tr((M†n ⊗M1∞)X) = c
X  0.
The final constraint simply expresses that X (corre-
sponding to our unknown state ρAB) is a valid density
matrix, hence a positive semidefinite operator. Just as
before, the solution Z∗ of this program yields a covariance
matrix Γ∗ =
[
VA12 Zσ
∗
Z
Z∗σZ VB12
]
, where σZ =
[
1 0
0 −1
]
and VA is
now the variance of ρn, which can be used to compute
the upper bound χ(Y ;E)ρ∗AB on the Holevo information
between Bob and Eve.
Such an SDP can be solved efficiently, but its size ap-
pears to grow quite rapidly with the number n of states
in the constellation. This is because the state ρAB is rep-
resented by an nN × nN matrix, with n the dimension
of Alice’s space (spanned by n coherent states) and an
N -dimensional truncation of Bob’s Fock space. For large
constellations, a better idea might be to truncate Alice’s
Hilbert space to the first N Fock states, which would
yield a matrix of size N2 ×N2.
It is instructive to consider what happens in the
limit n → ∞ where the constellation becomes ex-
actly Gaussian. In that case, the observable Mn tends
to the (rescaled and conjugated) heterodyne detection
(Mγ∞)
† = 1pi
∫
C
γβ¯|β〉〈β|dβ as the constellation ap-
proaches the thermal state ρ(γ):
Mn −−−−−−→
ρn→ρ(γ)
(Mγ∞)
†.
This is because the purification (1⊗√ρ(γ))∑∞i=0 |i〉|i〉 =√
1− γ2∑∞k=0 γk|k〉|k〉 of a thermal state ρ(γ) is a two-
mode squeezed vacuum state and performing a hetero-
dyne detection (corresponding to M1∞) on the first mode
prepares a coherent state |γα¯〉 for the second mode upon
measurement result α. In that case, the third constraint
becomes tr(((Mγ∞)
† ⊗M1∞)X) = c. We also know that a
heterodyne detection is nothing but two noisy homodyne
detections, which gives
tr(((Mγ∞)
† ⊗M1∞)X) = γ tr(((M1∞)† ⊗M1∞)X)
= γ tr
(
1
2
(qˆA ⊗ qˆB − pˆA ⊗ pˆB)X
)
= γ tr((ab+ a†b†)X).
In other words, the objective function of the SDP is sim-
ply a scalar multiple of the third constraint. As a conse-
quence, the solution is unique and given by γ−1c, which is
indeed the correct value of the covariance for a CVQKD
protocol with Gaussian modulation [49].
Since the limit of the SDP for large constellations (n→
∞) recovers the value of the secret key rate for protocols
with a Gaussian modulation, it is tempting to exploit
continuity arguments to show that the secret key rate
of CVQKD protocols with large constellations is close to
that of Gaussian protocols. To make this quantitative,
one must study the stability of the SDP of Eq. (6) against
small perturbations in the constraints, namely when ρn
approximates ρ(γ) and Mn approximates M
γ
∞ in the first
and third constraints, respectively. Such questions have
been studied in the literature on complex optimization,
for instance in Ref. [63], but are beyond the scope of the
present work.
V. DISCUSSION AND PERSPECTIVES
In this work, we give a general technique to derive
a lower bound on the secret key rate of CVQKD with
a discrete modulation, and apply it to the case of the
QPSK modulation. We do not expect this bound to be
tight and believe that it could likely be improved, but
this would require fundamentally new proof techniques.
The bound is loose because it crucially relies on Gaussian
optimality, meaning that χ(Y ;E) is computed for the
Gaussian state with the same covariance matrix as the
one returned by the SDP. That state, however, is non
Gaussian, and χ(Y ;E) is therefore overestimated. This
9is clear for instance in the QPSK protocol because ρA
is a mixture of four coherent states and therefore non
Gaussian. The issue is that the SDP is not looking for a
state that would yield the maximum value of χ(Y ;E) but
rather for a state with a very specific covariance matrix.
At the same time, this restriction disappears when the
size of the constellation increases since the SDP bound
converges to the optimal secret key rate in the limit of a
Gaussian modulation.
A remaining open question in the field of CVQKD
is whether one can provide a composable security proof
against general attacks for protocols with a discrete mod-
ulation. We do not get such a composable security proof
here because we do not analyze the parameter estima-
tion procedure. While parameter estimation is rather
straightforward for BB84-like protocols, the situation is
more complicated for continuous variables because we
need to obtain a confidence region for parameters such
as the variance of Bob’s state which are unbounded. Be-
cause of that, standard statistical tools to get tail bounds
on distributions of random variables such as the Cher-
noff bound or variants do not apply anymore. A solu-
tion is to exploit some specific symmetry of the protocol
in phase-space as in Ref. [16], but discrete modulations
break this symmetry and a new approach is therefore
needed. At the same time, the fact that Bob’s detection
is rotationally invariant gives hope that a rigorous analy-
sis of the parameter estimation procedure should be pos-
sible. Combining such an analysis with our results would
then yield a composable security proof valid against col-
lective attacks, and the exponential de Finetti theorem
of Renner and Cirac would then imply a composable se-
curity proof valid against general attacks [37], albeit with
pessimistic bounds in the finite-size regime. This points
to two important questions open to future work: analyze
the parameter estimation procedure of protocols with a
discrete modulation, and improve on the exponential de
Finetti theorem of Ref. [37].
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we focus on the CVQKD protocol with
a QPSK modulation and establish a lower bound on its
secret key rate in the asymptotic limit. This bound is ob-
tained by solving a semidefinite program that computes
the covariance matrix of the state shared by Alice and
Bob in the entanglement-based version of the protocol.
While our bounds are likely not tight, they already show
that secret key can be distributed over more than 100 km
for realistic values of the excess noise. We also show how
the same technique can be applied to analyze the security
of more complicated QAM. This is a major step towards
the full security of CVQKD with a discrete modulation.
If the parameter estimation procedure of such protocols
could be analysed rigorously, our result would imply a
composable security proof valid against general attacks.
We leave this question for future work.
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